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In trod uction 
Many authors have noted a connection between the metaphysics of 
time and the metaphysics of modality. The way we account for truths 
about the past, present or future has some structurally analogous fea-
tures to the ways we account for truths about what is actual, merely 
possible or necessary. However, most theorists approach the two areas 
of metaphysics in a piecemeal fashion, developing separate accounts for 
each area. This essay aims to show that the perspective one takes on 
the metaphysics of time does place limits on one's account of the meta-
physics of modality, including the surprising result that two leading 
theories - Mellor's tenseless theory of time and Adam's actualist the-
ory of modality - appear incompatible. . 
This essay first examines McTaggart's argument against the reality 
of tense and generates the modal analogue to that argument. The argu-
ments show us what the philosophical options are in both cases. Two 
pairs of metaphysical positions are legitimated - namely the tenseless 
theory and present ism with respect to time, together with modal real-
ism and actualism with respect to modality. The question is thus raised 
whether one is obliged to reason in parallel in both cases - that is, if 
one is a realist about the past, should one also be a realist about the 
non-actual? Or do certain disanalogies between time and modality 
serve to legitimate non-parallel reasoning? 
On the assumption that non-parallel combinations can be motivat-
ed, the various permutations are considered, with the conclusion forc-
ing the tenseless theorist to decide between modal realism and an 
actualism that takes modal facts to be primitive. 
I - McTaggart and the Unreality of Tense 
Time can be ordered in two ways, through A -series and B-series 
orderings. The A-series orders time through the properties past, present 
and future. The B-series orders time through the relations earlier-than, 
simultaneous-with and later-than. The two are not equivalent. Whilst it 
will always be a fact that 1st January 2013 is earlier-than 1st January 
2014, it will not always be true that 1st January 2014 is future, for it will 
eventually be present and past. 
McTaggart argues that this feature of the A-series generates incon-
sistency. What is the case is always changing, so every event has all 
A-series properties. Every event occupies every A-series location from 
distant future to present to distant past - as such, every event is past, 
present and future. But these properties are incompatible. Nothing real 
can have incompatible properties, so McTaggart thus famously con-
cludes that tense is unreal. 
A sceptic might wonder if there really is an incompatibility. Surely 
an event does not have all these properties at once - one need specify 
only when the event has each property. For example, once it is seen that 
an event e was future, is present and will be past, the incompatibility 
collapses. 
Unfortunately, this response only generates a regress, for we still 
resort to using tenses to explain when the event has the various tenses. 
McTaggart's argument applies equally well to these new compound 
tenses: it will be the case that it was the case that e is present, but also, 
it will be the case that it was the case that e is past. This is still a con-
tradiction. Again, it might be argued that those statements are also 
never true of the event together. We just have to say when the event has 
each compound property. But if this is done in tensed terms, the regress 
will still apply. 
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The issue at stake is clear when understood as a question of ontol-
ogy. As McTaggart states: 
'That M is future and will be present and past means that M is fu-
ture at a moment of present time, and present and past at different 
moments of future time.' (McTaggart 1927: p. 33) 
If 'M is present at a moment of future time' is taken literally, that is, 
predicating of a future moment the property of presentness, then the 
statement clearly cannot be true, for future and present are incompati-
ble. The problem is therefore to spell out which metaphysical positions 
can avoid such inconsistencies. There is more than one solution to this 
problem and one's choice depends on how one thinks about the nature 
of the present. 
That M is future is established by its relation to the present mo-
ment - but there is an ambiguity in what we mean by the term 'the 
present moment'. One option provides a metaphysically deflated ac-
count of tense. On this view, tense is relative to time of utterance, with 
'present' analysed as an indexical. The view is metaphysically defla-
tionary because each utterance of 'present' refers to the time with which 
it is simultaneous. Simultaneity is part of the B-series ordering, not the 
A-series. Each present-tensed (A-series) truth is thus made true by a 
tenseless (B-series) truthmaker. This project can be extended to other 
tenses: an utterance of 'New Year's Day 2014 is past' is true iff the event 
occurs at a time earlier than the time of utterance; an utterance of 
'New Year's Day 2014 is future' is true iff the event occurs at a time later 
than the time of utterance. This account thus requires that all times are 
equally real. This is because if past or future facts did not exist, the 
relata for earlier-than and later-than relations would not exist, and if the 
relata fail to exist, then any statement about the relation would turn out 
false, rather than true. This view thus agrees with McTaggart that 
there is in reality no such thing as tense - tensed truths are analysed 
with tense1ess facts. Call this response the tenseless theory, first articu-
lated fully in Mellor (1981). 
The second option is to treat the present as being ontologically 
significant. The term 'present' then need not be treated as an indexical, 
for the present time has a metaphysical distinction from other times -
a special status - that can itself be the target of reference. If the pre-
sent is onto logically significant, then the past was ontologically signifi-
cant and the future will be ontologically significant. However, what 
cannot be the case is that the future or past is ontologically significant. 
For then, as McTaggart shows, it could be said of a future moment that 
it is present, which is a contradiction. 
The upshot of this understanding of 'present' for the metaphysics of 
time is that the future and the past cannot exist. If they exist in any 
sense, then there will be something that is present in the future, or pre-
sent in the past. But if we deny reality to past and future, we provide 
a solution to McTaggart's argument, for there exists nothing in the 
future or past which can be present. The special status that the present 
has, in other words, is that it alone is concretely real. Call this solution 
presentism. 
When one takes McTaggart's argument in this way, it is easy to see 
that there is no other option. Either tense is or is not ontologically sig-
nificant. As such, these two solutions are the only solutions to Mc-
Taggart's argument. 
II - Modal Analogue of McTaggart's Argument 
Constructing a modal analogue of McTaggart's argument requires 
modal properties that are the analogue of tenses. Dyke (1996: 101-2) 
asserts that the correct analogue is properties like 'possible' and 'neces-
sary'. But since anything necessary is also possible, these properties, 
unlike tenses, are compatible, so Dyke doubts there is an analogue. But 
we should doubt Dyke has correctly identified the analogue. For neces-
sity is less an analogue for tense than for sempiternity, since what is 
present, past or future can also be sempiternal, just as what is possible 
can be necessary. But sempiternity is no tense and we should reject 
necessity as a modal equivalent of a tense. 
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A more plausible approach is found in Cresswell (1991). Cresswell 
claims that the correct analogy is what he terms the M-positions 'ac-
tual' and 'merely possible', where 'merely possible' means just what is 
possible but not actual. These M-positions are by definition incompati-
ble, unlike possibility and necessity. Cresswell also introduces an ana-
logue for the temporal notion of change, which he terms contingency. 
Although Cresswell is not explicit about how contingency is an ana-
logue for change, the relevant sense is as follows: just as change makes 
it possible for something future to eventually be present, contingency 
makes it possible for something possible to be actual. The two notions 
thus ground the following symmetry: 'It is now the case that a is F' is 
compatible with 'It was the case that a is - F', just as 'actually a is F' is 
compatible with 'merely possibly a is - F'. 
Dyke criticises this analogy by arguing that whilst A-positions 
between the distant past and the distant future make sense, M-positions 
between the actual and merely possible do not. But it is not clear what 
Dyke's objection amounts to. What A-positions does Dyke think there 
are between the past and future? Denying that there are M-positions 
between the actual and merely possible is analogous to denying that 
there are A-positions between past and present. And surely there are 
no such A-positions, just as there are no such M-positions. Further-
more, just as there are degrees of remoteness of the past and future, 
there are equally degrees of remoteness cif possibilities. 
If Cresswell's analogy is correct, then a McTaggart-like argument 
goes through. Contingency ensures all events are actual and merely 
possible, but actual and merely possible are incompatible properties. 
The analogy is clear: where McTaggart claims that a future non-present 
moment is present at a future moment, Cresswell claims that a possible 
non-actual event e is actual at a mere possible world. When taken liter-
ally, both are clearly contradictions. 
On the face of it, the approach one takes in the theory of time now 
constrains the approach one must take in the theory of modality, by 
parity of reasoning. The presentist solution argues that the present is 
ontologically privileged but other times are not. On the basis of that 
reasoning, the modal argument shows that the presentist cannot believe 
in the ontological privilege of the actual whilst simultaneously assert-
ing that the non-actual exists. Otherwise he will say of an event that it 
is actual where it is merely possible, which is a contradiction. This 
reasoning leads us to actualism, the view that only the actual exists. 
What about the tenseless theorist? The tenseless solution is that all 
times are real and no time ontologically privileged. That reasoning 
applied to the modal case informs him that he cannot believe in the 
non-actual unless he denies that the actual is metaphysically signifi-
cant. So just as the tenseless theorist provides a metaphysically de-
flated analysis of past, present and future, so too must a metaphysically 
deflated account of merely possible and actual be provided in the modal 
case. This is done by asserting the existence of concrete possible worlds. 
Just as the tenseless account of change is an account of an object's prop-
erties varying over time, such that a is F at t j , and a is ~ F at t2, the 
deflationary account of contingency is for a to have incompatible prop-
erties at different possible worlds. At world W j , a is F, but at world W 2, 
a is ~ F. This account is then combined with an indexical analysis of 
'actual', such that an utterance of 'a is actual' is true iff a exists at the 
world of utterance, and the reduction of modal truths to assertions 
about possible worlds: 'possibly p' is true at a world Wj iff p is true at a 
world W 2 accessible from W j ' (where 'accessibility' is a relation between 
worlds). Modal realism is the view that these possible worlds exist and 
. none is ontologically privileged, articulated fully in Lewis (1986). 
The tenseless theorist thus seems committed by parity of reasoning 
to asserting the existence of non-actual worlds. However, although 
most theorists are willing to countenance the reality of other times, few 
are happy to countenance the reality of other worlds. Most tense less 
theorists are actualists. Can they avoid this conclusion? 
To try to avoid an obligation of parallel reasoning, the tense less 
theorist might attempt to distinguish modality from time. First, we 
should note that he already has to distinguish time from another dimen-
sion, namely space. The tense less account of change is an account of 
properties varying at different times. This appears similar to the spatial 
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case, where we give an account of an object having different properties 
at different places, such as a poker which is hot at one end and cold at 
the other. To explain why spatial variation of this sort is not genuine 
change, something must be said. But perhaps what is said can also 
distinguish modality from time, for the problem is analogous in that 
case too: an object having different properties at different worlds. 
The tenseless theorist can argue plausibly that only temporal varia-
tion involves causation - that is, causation is not involved in spatial or 
modal variation, but brings about temporal variation. As time is the 
dimension in which causation inheres, there is an obvious metaphysical 
distinction between time and modality. This distinction, it might be 
argued, justifies adopting the tense less theory in one case and actualism 
in the other. The different responses underwrite the way in which the 
tenseless theorist thinks time and modality differ metaphysically. 
Two things need be said in response. First, is causation a pertinent 
difference? It certainly serves to distinguish time and modality, but 
why is this enough to justify a non-analogous approach to the ontology 
of both? 
Second, assuming that his distinction is sufficient to justify non-
parallel reasoning, the tense less theorist still has a problem. Not only is 
there a McTaggart-like argument in the modal case, but also in the spa-
tial case too. It can be set up quickly as follows: although I am here, I 
am nonetheless there from the perspective of an observer. So I am both 
here and there. But here and there are incompatible properties. As with 
the temporal and modal cases, there are two options. I can deny reality 
to the non-here, or deny that spatial tenses such as here-ness have any 
metaphysical significance. Along with most tenseless theorists, I sus-
pect, I would claim that all spaces are real and that here-ness is not 
ontologically privileged. Now, although the tense less theorist can use 
causation to distinguish time from modality and space, and thereby 
justify non-parallel reasoning in both cases, he takes a realist route in 
the spatial case and the non-realist actualist route in the modal case. 
This is once again a failure of parity of reasoning, for if space and mo-
dality have only been differentiated from time, what reason is there to 
treat them differently from each other? Therefore, he must provide a 
similar reason as provided in the temporal case for treating modality 
and space differently. But what sort of difference could that be? 
This line of reasoning presents a problem for the presentist too, if 
the presentist takes the realist solution to the spatial argument. If noth-
ing can be said, all parties are saddled with at least one unattractive 
commitment: modal realism for the tenseless theorist or anti-realism 
about space for the presentist. 
III - Ersatzer Actualism and Ersatzer Presentism 
Although the question remains unanswered, let us assume that 
there is some pertinent difference among space, time and modality that 
allows us to engage in non-parallel reasoning when giving accounts of 
each. If non-analogous solutions to McTaggart-like arguments can be 
combined, are there considerations about the positions themselves that 
make some combinations more attractive than others? In addition to 
modal realism and the tenseless theory, we should first introduce ac-
counts of actualism and presentism. 
Ersatzer Actualism 
There are many varieties of actualism. Following Lewis' (1986: 
136-191) excellent analysis of the various positions, I agree that the best 
account belongs to Adams (1974). 
Adams believes only that which is actual is concretely real. Adams 
takes possible worlds to be maximally consistent sets of propositions, 
which he terms world-stories. World-stories are constructed out of the 
furniture of the actual world. World-stories are abstract entities and 
not spatiotemporal. They are each accessible from one another via a 
truth-making relationship - 'p is possible' at a world w is made true by 
p being a member of a world-story accessible from w. The actual world 
is also a story on this account, but it is a special story for all its propo-
sitions are made true by what is concretely the case. There is thus a 
distinction between truth-at-a-world and truth simpliciter, which cap-
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tures the metaphysical difference between the actual and merely possi-
ble. 'Unicorns exist' is true simpliciter iff there are concretely unicorns. 
'Unicorns exist' is true-at-a-world iff 'unicorns exist' is a member of 
some world-story. 
Ersatzer Presentism 
The corresponding temporal position is ersatzer presentism (Bourne 
2006). Bourne postulates the existence of an abstract set-theoretic 
structure to provide truthmakers for the past. The abstract structure is 
in effect an ersatz B-series, comprising maximal sets of present-tensed 
propositions affixed with date stamps to form each ersatz time (analo-
gous to Adams' world stories). These ersatz time-stories are ordered 
set-theoretically (E-related) in a way which intuitively represents the 
'earlier than' relation. The present is also a time-story on this account, 
but this time-story is special by being made true by what is concretely 
the case. There is thus a distinction between truth-at-a-time and truth 
simpliciter which captures what is metaphysically distinctive about the 
present. 'Plato exists' is true simpliciter iff it is concretely the case that 
Plato exists. 'Plato exists' is true-at-a-time if it is a member of some past 
time E-related to the present times (i.e. the time that is made true by 
what is concretely the case). 
The possibility of these views demonstrates how an indexical ac-
count of 'present' or 'actual' - that is,' one which relates statements 
about what is present or actual to the time or world of utterance - is 
not the only approach. The primacy of the tenseless theory has led 
authors to take such an indexical account as standard. Even actualist-
presentists like Ned Markosian, for example, think that the indexical 
analysis of 'present' and 'actual' is 'utterly un controversial. .. in the 
sense that no theorist should deny [it] and no theorist. .. in fact denies 
[it]' (Markosian 2001: 622, see also endnote 22). That no theorist should 
deny it is too strong, that no theorist does is false. Adams, for one, de-
nies that 'actual' is an indexical - actual refers to whatever the meta-
physically distinct actual world is. Whilst Bourne commits himself 
neither way, he too notes that 'present' need not be treated indexically. 
Markosian can refer to the ontologically privileged present time and 
actual world by taking their metaphysical distinction as a target of 
reference, so his attachment to the indexical approach is not warranted. 
IV - Combinations 
Let us now examine the possible positions in the philosophy of time 
and modality and see how they combine together. 
Tenseless Theory / Modal Realism 
These two views go together straightforwardly, for the advocate of 
both responds in parallel fashion to the temporal and modal arguments, 
taking other worlds and other times to be real, with none ontologically 
privileged. 
Ersatzer Presentism / Ersatzer Actualism 
This combination also responds in parallel to both the temporal and 
modal arguments, claiming that only the present and actual are real and 
that the non-present and the non-actual belong to the realm of the ab-
stract. However, it is not immediately obvious that the views combine 
unproblematically. 
One problem seems to be an overabundance of truthmakers. For 
any true indicative utterance is made true three times over, by a propo-
sition in the actual world-story, by a proposition in the present time-
story and by the world itself! What should be said? 
The holder of this combination should claim that ersatz times 
embed into ersatz worlds. Rather than a proposition existing distinctly 
in each structure, it exists once. Presentism provides a set-theoretic 
temporal structure and actualism provides a set-theoretic world struc-
ture over the very same propositions. Since any world needs a temporal 
structure in order to represent what is the case at different times, the 
actual world-story will feature the actual temporal structure. So there 
are only two claimants to make true an utterance - the proposition of 
the world-story or the object itself that exists simpliciter. 
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For consistency's sake, the utterance should be made true by the 
proposition in the world-story. For propositions in turn are made true 
by what is the case simpliciter. Both ersatzer actualism and ersatzer 
present ism take propositions to be timeless, non-spatiotemporal enti-
ties, so they can agree on a two-part relationship: utterances correspond 
to propositions in world stories (e.g. 'Santa Claus exists') and the onto-
logically privileged present in effect selects (via a truth-making rela-
tionship) a collection of propositions that are true simpliciter. An 
utterance pertaining to what is actual is true iff the proposition exists 
in a world story and is made true by what exists simpliciter. 
One consequence of this is that proposition can be made true whilst 
being a member of more than one world story. Many propositions will 
exist in more than one world story, and given the plausible condition 
that propositions are differentiable from one another only if they differ 
in meaning, we would risk arbitrary duplication by denying that they 
do. But this gives rise to a second objection: what is concretely the case 
therefore fails to select only those propositions that are part of the ac-
tual world-story. 
In response, the holder of these views should first deny that it is 
determinate which world-story is the actual world-story. This, of 
course, does not mean that what is concretely the case is indeterminate. 
It means that there are a number of world stories whose histories agree 
with what has concretely been the case up until the present moment, 
but as the future is yet to be the case, then each of these worlds will tell 
a different story about the future. Each will have as members different 
propositions at various future times. But the actual world-story can be 
deduced to be among these worlds, even though there may never be a 
fact of the matter which world-story is the one and only actual world-
story. The concrete present thus splits the set of world-stories into two: 
those that disagree with the concrete present for some time that has 
been (or is) the case, and those that do not. 
He should then agree that some propositions made true by the con-
crete present are members of world-stories that give a history quite 
different from what has concretely been the case. But such world-
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stories will fall into the set of those excluded from consideration for 
being the actual-world story, for they will have disagreed about what 
has concretely been the case at some past time. They have been dis-
credited and can never rejoin the pack that continues hunting for the 
actual, however well they agree with what takes place thereafter. The 
second objection is thus harmless: in no way are excluded possibilities 
ever claimed to be actual. 
The above considerations suggest that these two views can be com-
bined attractively. They make a parallel distinction between what is 
real and what is abstract and share the resources needed for world-
stories and time-stories. 
Tenseless Theory / Ersatzer Actualism 
The advocate of this combination approaches time and modality 
differently, believing in the reality of other times but only the actual 
world. It is not easy to find tenseless theorists who state categorically 
that they endorse both positions, but many seem prepared to accept it 
as a possibility. See, for example, Robin Le Poidevin's comments in his 
1991 (34-35). Is this approach commendable? I argue that it is not. 
Adams' actualism requires a temporal structure, as noted, if it is to 
represent at any world what is true at different times. Furthermore, 
given that the actualist believes that the actual world is also a story, 
then this structure will apply as much to the actual world as to any 
other (with the one difference that, for the tenseless theorist, it is deter-
minate which world-story is the actual world story, given that on his 
view there are facts already in the future to decide the matter). The 
structure, as part of Adams' worlds, will be a set-theoretic ordering of 
propositions, satisfying various constraints - in fact what it requires 
must be very similar to Bourne's theory. 
Now, although the actualist component needs a theory like 
Bourne's, this does not imply the tenseless theorist is committed to a 
metaphysically distinguished present. For on Bourne's view, the pre-
sent time in the abstract structure is just a set theoretic ordering of 
propositions, like any other. The problem is rather that as the tenseless 
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theorist gets time-stories for free, he now has ersatz times which can 
play the role of truthmakers for past truths. If this is so, what is the 
motivation for the tenseless theorist to posit an onto logically real past? 
He can hardly deny that propositions in time-stories are fit to be 
truthmakers, for just those very same propositions are his truthmakers 
for modal claims! In this scenario, the tenseless theorist thus needs 
another reason to believe in the existence of other times quite apart 
from conclusions drawn from McTaggart's argument. 
Because the two conclusions are not based upon analogous meta-
physical frameworks (with times real, worlds abstract), there lies a 
problem where the metaphysics of modality intersects with the meta-
physics of time. For here, the two say something different with respect 
to the actual past. 
Ersatzer Presentism / Modal Realism 
On this combination, truthmakers for past and future truths are 
abstract, whilst modal truthmakers are supposedly concrete. It there-
fore postulates a multitude of spatiotemporally disjoint presents. This 
by itself is not incoherent. But this position is equally difficult to moti-
vate. For the presentist, despite his professing the unreality of actual 
non-present times, in fact incurs an ontological commitment to all of 
them through his modal-realism. 
The view must provide concrete truthmakers for possibilities. But 
all possibilities take place at a time. Assuming presentism, at any world, 
only one concrete time, the metaphysically distinguished present time, 
concretely exists. Take the concrete present PI in possible world WI' 
How can a possibility at any time witn earlier than PI be represented? 
Only if another possible world Wn exists, such that wn is historically 
identical with WI up to tn and tn is concretely the case (i.e. present). But 
WI could just be our world, for what has been the case in our world is 
also surely possible. Supposing WI to be our world, then each past time 
is concretely represented by some possible world like W n• 
It would thus seem that the ontological commitment of the modal 
realist-presentist is certainly no less than that of the tenseless theorist. 
The difference is that the presentist has his actual past times spread out 
across many worlds! But if the presentist is prepared to countenance 
the existence of these concrete times and accept that they can playa 
truthmaking role in the modal case, why not let them represent actual 
past times and employ them to playa truthmaking role in the temporal 
case? But with both temporal and modal truth makers concretely real, 
the ersatz temporal structures of the presentist are now rendered redun-
dant. 
I will just note in passing that I do not think that the choice of 
temporal theory has to be considered a claim about what time is like in 
all possible worlds. It is conceivably a contingent matter whether there 
is an ontologically privileged present or not, given the plausibility of 
both presentism and the tenseless theory. A modal realist-presentist 
might simply be saying of his world that the present is ontologically 
privileged whilst remaining agnostic about the existence of other, 
tense less worlds. Nonetheless, the above problem remains. It does raise 
an interesting question about how an ersatzer actualist-presentist could 
capture the idea of theories of time being contingent, insofar as all 
truths at all times in his possible worlds are, irrespective of what theory 
of time holds, made true by propositions. But that puzzle is beyond the 
scope of this essay. 
v - Can the tenseless theorist avoid modal realism? 
The ersatzer presentist seems unable to motivate the adoption of 
modal realism, but ersatzer actualism is available and this is an attrac-
tive option. But what can the tenseless theorist do if, for the above 
reasons, the best account of actual ism is unavailable to him? Must he 
be a modal realist? 
There is one other plausible option left available, but this solution 
has its problems. My presentation of the actualist and presentist op-
tions has relied on ersatz theories. Surrogate worlds and times are con-
structed out of abstract objects - sets of propositions. The remaining 
option for the tenseless theorist is to insist that such surrogates are not 
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necessary. 
To reject ersatz possible worlds is to take modal properties as 
primitive, a view called modalism. Its main benefit is to offer objectiv-
ity to modal truths, without the objects - e.g. surrogate worlds. On this 
view, an utterance of 'it could be the case that p' is true iff 'p' could be 
true, wherep is an indicative statement. But if the tense less theorist can 
make it attractive to abandon ersatz worlds, the existence of a parallel 
position in the temporal case might force an ersatzer presentist to aban-
don his ersatz times. Arthur Prior's view is just such a position. Ac-
cording to his temporal primitivism, an utterance of 'it was the case that 
p' is true iff 'p' was true, and 'it will be the case that P' is true iff 'p' will 
be true, where p is a present-tensed statement. 
First, there is a problem common to both views. Modalism fails to 
capture all modal truths. In particular, it fails to capture quantification 
over possibilities - that is, the enumeration of different ways that 
something could happen. 'Jim could win the chess match' is true iff 
'Jim wins the chess match' could be true. But 'there are three ways that 
Jim could win his chess match' is true iff 'there are three ways that Jim 
does win his chess match' could be true. Yet this could not be true, 
because there is only ever one way that Jim wins his chess match, if he 
wins at all. The modalist seems unable to tease the three ways apart. 
(Joe Melia highlights some further problems for the modalist in his 
(2003: 81-98).) 
Lewis (2004) provides an analogous objection for the temporal case 
as follows: 'King James I was King of England' is true iff 'King James I 
is King of England' was true. But 'King James I and King James II were 
both Kings of England' is true iff 'King James I and King James II are 
both Kings of England' was true. But this was not true, for they were 
Kings at different times. 
This quantificational problem needs addressing. But if both posi-
tions can overcome the objection, there is reason to think that ersatz 
times are much more secure than the ersatz worlds. 
First, in one important respect, ersatz worlds do not fulfil an analo-
gous function to ersatz times. Ersatz times can be used to provide an 
analysis of past, present and future in just the same way that the real 
B-series does for the tense less theorist. But ersatz worlds do not provide 
a reduction of modal operators in the way that Lewisian worlds do. For 
as Lewis 0986: 150-157) rightly points out, maximally consistent ersatz 
worlds cannot be articulated without using modal notions - for exam-
ple, consistent sets of propositions are sets of propositions that could be 
true together. If we have no equivalent indicative statement, then an 
actualist still has to assume some sort of primitive modality in order to 
generate enough world-stories to capture all the possibilities - 'Possi-
ble worlds' could not be used to explain what we meant by possibility, 
if we could not get rid of modal notions in articulating what they were. 
In any case, a commitment to primitive modality is held by both the 
modalist and the ersatzer actualist - worlds bring no benefit on that 
front. If this objection is strong, then should the presentist also aban-
don actualism? He might. But if he has a full complement of sets and 
propositions to construct his ersatz times, he incurs no cost in putting 
them to double-duty in articulating certain modal truths. The point 
here is that the tense less theorist has at least one positive argument for 
abandoning ersatz worlds. 
Second, the coherence of temporal primitivism is doubtful. The 
metaphysics behind Prior's account is a species of presentism, in that 
only the present time exists. But as it contains no abstract structure, 
whatever facts there are about the future and past must exist at the 
ontologically privileged present. This ontology raises a problem over 
the maintenance of truth-value links between times (Bourne 2006: 2-6). 
If it is now the case that it will be the case that p, then there presently 
exists a fact thatp will be. But that fact only ever exists at that moment. 
So when a future time becomes present, what ensures thatp will be the 
case at that time? For at that time, a distinct collection of facts will 
obtain - what kind of connection guarantees that one fact then will 
make it true that p? 
There is no modal analogue of the truth-value links problem. The 
lack of analogy is bound up with the fact that whilst genuine change 
occurs over time, it does not occur between possibilities. Therefore, 
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temporal primitivism is to be rejected. However, modal ism may yet be 
defensible. As ersatz worlds have less relative benefit than ersatz times, 
the tenseless theorist can motivate this approach. 
Conclusion 
Where time and modality intersect, a philosopher's account of the 
metaphysics of modality and the metaphysics of time had better agree. 
Where one takes different frameworks in each case, such as combining 
ersatz and realist accounts, they may not. But adopting a primitivist 
framework in lieu of an ersatz account offers a potential solution. As 
shown, only modal ism seems a defensible primitivism, but the modalist 
has many challenges ahead of him. So whilst the tenseless theorist toils 
over a satisfactory primitivist position that obviates a commitment to 
modal realism, the ersatzer presentist and ersatzer actualist combine to 
make merry bedfellows. 
Bibliography 
Adams, R. M. (1974), "Theories of Actuality," Nous, 8: 211-231 
Bourne, C. P. (2006), "A Theory of Presentism," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 
36: 1, 1-24 
Cresswell, M. J. (1990), "Modality and Mellor's McTaggart," Studia Logica, 49: 
163-70 
Dyke, H. (1996), "Real Times and Possible Worlds," in Le Poidevin, R. (ed.) 
Questions of Time and Tense (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 
93-118 
Markosian, N. (2000, 'Critical Study: Robin Le Poidevin, editor, Questions of 
Time and Tense', Nous, 35: 4, 616-629 
McTaggart, J. MeT. E. (1927), 'The Unreality of Time' repr. in Le Poidevin, R. 
& Macbeath, M. (eds.) (1993) The Philosophy of Time (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press), 23-34 
Melia, J. (2003), Modality (Acumen) 
Mellor, D. H. (1980, Real Time (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 
Le Poidevin, R. (1990, Change. Cause and Contradiction: A Defence of the 
Tenseless Theory of Time (London: Macmillan) 
Lewis, D. K. (1986), On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Basil Blackwell) 
___ (2004), 'Tensed Quantifiers', in D. Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in 
Metaphysics, Volume I (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 3-14 
